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CONSTRUCTING THE OTHER: U.S. 
MUSLIMS, ANTI-SHARIA LAW, AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
VOLATILE INTERCULTURAL RHETORIC 
CARLO A. PEDRIOLI* 
Ignorance is the parent of fear, and being completely nonplussed and 
confounded about the stranger, I confess I was now as much afraid of him 
as if it was the devil himself who had thus broken into my room at the dead 
of night.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, legislators have proposed, discussed, and passed various 
laws that aimed to limit the use of foreign law, international law, and 
Sharia in state court systems. During the latest set of legislative sessions, 
legislators in twenty-three states put forth forty-one bills of this sort.2 Most 
of the bills died at the ends of the legislative sessions, but not all did.3 If 
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 1.  HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 34 (Hershel Parker & Harrison Hayford eds., W.W. 
Norton & Co. 2d ed. 2002) (1851). 
 2.  Bill Raftery, Bans on Court Use of Sharia/International Law: Showdown Vote in Michigan 
Set for After November Election, GAVEL TO GAVEL (October 4, 2012), 
http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2012/10/04/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-showdown-vote-in-
michigan-set-for-after-november-election. 
 3.  Id. 
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trends were to continue, proponents of such bills would introduce similar 
bills in new states and revive bills in states that had tabled the bills.4 
While foreign law, as the law of another country,5 and international 
law, as the law among various nations,6 are relatively easy to understand at 
a conceptual level, Sharia may prove more difficult for individuals outside 
of Islamic circles to grasp. Sharia is a branch of Islamic law, which has two 
main branches, Sharia and fiqh.7 Sharia is “the divine law that is infallible, 
perfect, universal, eternal and unchanging.”8 In a literal sense, Sharia 
means “path to the watering place,” which suggests that Sharia “is the 
source of life.”9 Sharia calls upon several sacred texts, including the Koran, 
which is the Muslim holy book, and the Sunnah, which contains sayings of 
the prophet Muhammad.10 In contrast with Sharia, fiqh is the human 
comprehension of divine law, which is fallible and changing.11 In a literal 
sense, fiqh means “‘understanding’ or ‘perception.’”12 Fiqh is a recognition 
that humans grapple with the Koran and the Sunnah to try to understand 
what transcends human understanding.13 Islamic law is not uniform 
throughout the world, and such law has various schools of interpretation.14 
Sunni Muslims have schools of interpretation called Hanafi, Maliki, 
Shafi’i, and Hanbali, while Shia Muslims have a school of interpretation 
called Ithna Ashari.15 Not surprisingly, Islamic scholars often disagree on 
the content of Islamic law.16 
In linking Sharia, by which legislators probably mean Islamic law in 
general, to foreign and international law, legislators have constructed 
 
 4.  Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/31shariah.html. 
 5.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 720 (9th ed. 2009). 
 6.  Id. at 892. 
 7.  Frank Vogel, An Introduction to Law of the Islamic World, 31 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 353, 
356–57 (2003). 
 8.  Id. at 356. 
 9.  Donald Brown, A Destruction of Muslim Identity: Ontario’s Decision to Stop Shari’a-based 
Arbitration, 32 N.C .J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 495, 515 (2007). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Vogel, supra note 7, at 356–57. 
 12.  Id. at 357. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  James Thornback, The Portrayal of Sharia in Ontario, 10 APPEAL 1, 5 (2005). 
 15.  Id. at 4. Of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims, 85 percent are Sunni, and 15 percent are Shia. 
Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, the Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years After 9/11, 
13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 33, 45 (2009). 
 16.  John R. Bowen, How Could English Courts Recognize Shariah?, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 411, 
434 (2010). 
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Sharia as “foreign” or “international,” neither of which is “American” as 
related to the United States. This rhetorical approach has unfolded in 
various proposed constitutional amendments. For example, in Iowa, a 
proposed state constitutional amendment aimed to prohibit state courts 
from upholding the law of another state if the law of the other state 
included Sharia.17 The proposed amendment commanded, “The courts shall 
not use the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the 
courts shall not consider international law or Sharia law.”18 In Missouri, a 
corresponding proposed state constitutional amendment, in almost the exact 
same language, declared, “The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of 
other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider 
international law or Sharia law.”19 In Alabama, a proposed state 
constitutional amendment used language comparable to that of the 
proposed amendments in Iowa and Missouri.20 In Wyoming, a similar 
proposed state constitutional amendment instructed, “The courts shall not 
consider the legal precepts of other nations or cultures including, without 
limitation, international law and Sharia law.”21 In New Mexico, a 
comparable state constitutional amendment declared, “The courts shall not 
consider or apply Sharia law.”22 
Not all of the proposed laws specifically identified Sharia. For 
instance, in 2010, Louisiana passed a law that purported “to protect its 
citizens from the application of foreign laws when the application of a 
foreign law [would] result in the violation of a right guaranteed by the 
constitution of this state or of the United States.”23 Nearly a year later, 
Arizona passed a law that prohibited enforcement of foreign law if such 
enforcement would violate a right that the Arizona Constitution or the U.S. 
Constitution guaranteed, or if such enforcement would conflict with the 
laws of Arizona or the United States.24 
Because it became law, one proposed state constitutional amendment 
that rhetorically linked Sharia to foreign and international law is of 
 
 17.  H.R.J. Res. 14, 84th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  H.R.J. Res. 31, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011). 
 20.  H.R. 597, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011); S. 62, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011). 
 21.  H.R.J. Res. 8, 2011 Leg., 2011 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2011). 
 22.  S.J. Res. 18, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2011). 
 23.  2010 La. Acts, No. 714, § 6000(B). 
 24.  H.B. 2064, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011). A domestic court is unlikely to uphold a 
foreign law that would violate domestic law. Thus, one may wonder why states would pass laws that 
solve a non-existent problem. 
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particular note. In the 2010 midterm elections, Oklahoma passed State 
Question 755 (“SQ 755”), a constitutional amendment that aimed to place 
restrictions on the use of foreign law, international law, and Sharia in 
Oklahoma courts.25 SQ 755 declared, “The Courts shall not look to the 
legal precepts of other nations and cultures. Specifically, the courts shall 
not consider international law or Sharia Law.”26 SQ 755 would prohibit 
Oklahoma courts from considering law from another state if the other 
state’s law included Sharia.27 
That many of these proposed laws were so similar should not be a 
surprise. David Yerushalmi, a lawyer and a “Hasidic Jew with a history of 
controversial statements about race, immigration and Islam,” began writing 
a model anti-Sharia statute in 2009.28 Yerushalmi designed his model 
statute to appeal to both those opposed to Islam and those against the 
influence of foreign law in the United States.29 Frank Gaffney, “a hawkish 
policy analyst and commentator,” as well as president of the Center for 
Security Policy, who had funded Yerushalmi’s work in the past, promoted 
the anti-Sharia model statute.30 In 2009, a nonprofit organization named the 
American Public Policy Alliance came into being and began recruiting 
lawyers who could act as legislative sponsors for the bills.31 Gaffney stated 
that he and Yerushalmi planned to “engender a national debate about the 
nature of Shariah and the need to protect [the] Constitution and country 
from it.”32 
Sharia, like other types of religious law, could appear in civil courts in 
the United States in various ways. For instance, some Muslims may want to 
arbitrate or mediate contractual disputes, divorce matters, or child custody 
issues according to Sharia. Just as civil courts have enforced arbitration 
 
 25.  H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg. 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010), also known as Okla. State Question 
755 (Gen. Elect. Nov. 2, 2010). 
 26.  Id. § 1(C). 
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Elliott, supra note 4. See also States Move to Ban Islamic Sharia Law, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(March 11, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/11/134458058/States-Move-to-Ban-Islamic-Sharia-Law 
[hereinafter States Move]. 
 29.  Elliott, supra note 4. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. Some groups responded to Yerushalmi’s proposed law, which aimed to characterize 
Sharia “as one of the greatest threats to American freedom since the cold war.” Id. For instance, 
Catholic bishops and Jewish groups, as well as the American Civil Liberties Union, criticized the law. 
Id. Muslims responded as well. Salam Al-Marayati, president of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, 
described the rhetoric as “purely a political wedge to create fear and hysteria.” Id. 
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decisions from the Jewish beth din system that have conformed to secular 
arbitration standards, civil courts could enforce Sharia-based arbitration 
decisions that conformed to the same standards.33 Additionally, many 
Muslims may want to execute their wills according to Sharia. As with other 
valid wills, secular or sacred in nature, probate courts would execute valid 
Muslim wills according to the requests of the testators. 
Laws like Oklahoma’s State Question 755 are problematic for a 
variety of reasons. One key reason is that such laws discriminate against 
U.S. Muslims, out of whose religious tradition Sharia comes, and fail to 
offer an explanation for such discrimination, instead appealing to public 
ignorance of Islam and fear of terrorism. The result of such laws is to 
sacrifice the rights of rank-and-file U.S. Muslims in the middle of thr 
political theater. To focus on a law that has been approved by the 
legislature and then the public, rather than on those laws that simply have 
been proposed, this Article will address the case of Oklahoma’s SQ 755. 
Greater understanding of the legal and communication problems associated 
with SQ 755, particularly as those problems impact U.S. Muslims, a 
religious minority that makes up less than 1 percent of the adult U.S. 
population,34 will provide both legislators and members of the public an 
opportunity to become more informed regarding passing future legislation 
and voting on future state constitutional amendments of this sort. 
This Article initially will contextualize the matter of SQ 755 by noting 
how U.S. society in general, and Oklahoma in particular, have constructed 
U.S. Muslims as Others, or Strangers. Then the Article will offer some 
background on SQ 755, which itself is a specific manifestation of the 
rhetorical construction of Muslims as Others. Next the Article will analyze 
how SQ 755 violates various provisions of the U.S. Constitution, including 
the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, the Supremacy Clause, 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Contracts 
 
 33.  Omar T. Mohammedi, Shariah-Compliant Wills, 25 PROB. & PROP. 58, 63 (2011). 
 34.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DIVISION, TABLE 75: SELF-DESCRIBED RELIGIOUS 
IDENTIFICATION OF ADULT POPULATION: 1990 TO 2008, available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0075.pdf. The Pew Research Center estimates 
that Muslims make up 0.6 percent of the adult U.S. population. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM 
AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM 9 (2007), available at 
http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf. The make-up of the U.S. Muslim population is 
diverse. Out of all U.S. Muslims, 38 percent are White, 26 percent are Black, 20 percent are Asian, and 
16 percent are mixed or other. Id. at 17. 
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Clause. Finally, the Article will suggest a dialogic approach,35 channeled 
through the Johari Window, which is a vehicle for information exchange,36 
for deconstructing the notion of U.S. Muslims as Others and reconstructing 
them as Selves, or non-Strangers, within U.S. culture. 
II. MUSLIMS AS OTHERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
U.S. society has constructed, or, in some cases, at least tolerated the 
construction of, Muslims as Others. The Other is the Stranger.37 In ancient 
times, travelers came home with stories of Strangers.38 Frequently, those 
travelers would offer their responses to Others’ “bizarre and abnormal 
ways-of-doing” and “compliment[ ] themselves on their superiority.”39 The 
Other is not always someone40 who lives elsewhere. Rather he or she may 
be someone new to an area who desires to be a permanent part of the 
community in the future. In this case, the Stranger is not “the wanderer who 
comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather [is] the person who comes 
today and stays tomorrow.”41 One can encounter the Other “at the airport, 
on the subway, in the hotel corridor, in the supermarket aisles, in a 
conversation with a call-center operator, in Starbucks, 7-11, Taco Bell, and 
the ubiquitous ‘Irish bars’ that dot urban landscapes around the world.”42 
Today, as in earlier times, the Other is inferior to the “gold standard” of 
 
 35.  In Greek, the term “dialogue” refers to “seeing through.” Liyakatali Takim, From 
Conversion to Conversation: Interfaith Dialogue in Post 9-11 America, 94 THE MUSLIM WORLD 343, 
346 (2004). Dialogue can foster better understandings among different groups, including faith groups, 
and promote peaceful co-existence. Id. Alwi Shihab notes that dialogue “is the most appropriate stance 
to meet the demands of the pluralism of society and the maturity humanity has reached in this age.” 
Alwi Shihab, Christian-Muslim Relations into the Twenty-first Century, 15 ISLAM & CHRISTIAN-
MUSLIM REL. 65, 74 (2004). 
 36.  Lynn Little, Leadership Communication and the Johari Window, 24 ADMINISTRATOR 4, 4 
(2005). 
 37.  Lynda Dee Dixon, Cultural Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Others: Cherokee 
Humanistic Research Project, Article Version of Keynote Address at the National Communication 
Association Hope Faculty Development Institute 16, 17 (2005). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  The Other can be an institution. For a description of the rhetorical construction of the 
Catholic Church as Other in Mormon discourse, see generally Phil J. Chidester, “Firm in Defense of 
Freedom, Family, and Christianity”: Mormonism, Pope John Paul II, and the Rhetorical Other, in THE 
RHETORIC OF POPE JOHN PAUL II 283 (Joseph R. Blaney & Joseph P. Zompetti eds., 2009). 
 41.  GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 402 (Kurt H. Wolff ed. & trans., 
1964). 
 42.  Tim Simpson, The Proximal Other: Globalization and the Itinerant Subject of Intercultural 
Communication Research, 31 INT’L & INTERCULTURAL ANN. 1, 23 (2008). 
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one’s own culture or group.43 The process of othering defines membership 
in a group and reinforces the norms of the group,44 and being the Other is 
only possible in relation to such a group.45 
Recent immigrants who face the challenge of assimilation into 
mainstream U.S. culture,46 including many Muslims,47 are easily 
constructed as Others. Assimilation is “a state that reflects a maximum 
convergence of strangers’ internal conditions with those of the natives and 
of a minimum maintenance of the original cultural habits.”48 Some 
observers see assimilation as something that produces “more ‘functional’ 
immigrants,”49 while other observers see it as a process that “can lead to 
immigrant feelings of isolation, depression, hatred toward the host culture, 
and to a state of monoculturalism.”50 Whether or not assimilation is 
desirable, it is more difficult when a group stands out, which many U.S. 
Muslims do since they are more visually identifiable than non-Muslims.51 
For example, many Muslim women wear veils.52 Society can then easily 
construct such individuals as Others. 
Those outside the immigrant group, in this case non-Muslims, often 
fear the immigrant group. Reasons for the fear can include the different 
religious rituals, clothing, and language of the new group.53 Difference 
 
 43.  Dixon, supra note 37, at 17, 18. 
 44.  Lori DeWitt, The Other Side of Othering: How Muslims Construct American Christians 
Through Dialogue, Paper Presented at the National Communication Association Annual Meeting 7 
(2008). 
 45.  WILLIAM B. GUDYKUNST & YOUNG YUN KIM, COMMUNICATING WITH STRANGERS 25 (3d 
ed. 1997). 
 46.  Young and second-generation immigrants are often more willing to assimilate. Maram 
Hallak & Kathryn Quina, In the Shadows of the Twin Towers: Muslim Immigrant Women’s Voices 
Emerge, 51 SEX ROLES 329, 332 (2004). 
 47.  During the twentieth century, a dramatic increase in the migration of Muslims to the United 
States took place. Takim, supra note 35, at 343. 
 48.  GUDYKUNST & KIM, supra note 45, at 338. 
 49.  Stephen M. Croucher, French-Muslim Reactions to the Law Banning Religious Symbols in 
Schools: A Mixed Methods Analysis, 2 J. INT’L & INTERCULTURAL COMM. 1, 11 (2009) (discussing 
Muslims in France). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 3. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 12 (discussing French and British fear of Muslim immigrants). See also Lori G. 
Beaman, The Myth of Pluralism, Diversity, and Vigor: The Constitutional Privilege of Protestantism in 
the United States and Canada, 42 J. SCI. STUD. RELIG. 311, 319–20 (2003) (providing a Canadian 
example of the intersection of immigrant religion and the workplace in which a Sikh, because of his 
religious beliefs, refused to wear a hard hat at work). 
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between the Self and the Other is key.54 Often, seriously engaging this 
difference can challenge majority assumptions and beliefs, which is 
uncomfortable.55 By exploiting fear, powerful cultural communicators, 
including the media,56 produce rhetoric that implies “that an abject 
population threatens the common good and must be rigorously governed 
and monitored by all sectors of society.”57 Othering involves discourse that 
can dehumanize the Other, and the process of othering justifies negative 
action toward the Other.58 While doing rhetorical, or even physical, 
violence to the Other, the majority group loses an opportunity to 
understand itself more deeply through open dialogue with the Other.59 If 
the majority group fully destroys the Other, the majority group will need to 
create another Other to maintain in-group cohesion.60 
U.S. society constructed Muslims as Others early in its history, setting 
precedent for later eras.61 Muslims were some of the first slaves brought to 
the Americas,62 and, during the eighteenth century, thousands of young 
West African Muslims of different ethnic backgrounds were brought to 
what became the United States.63 Although most Muslim slaves have 
remained anonymous or left behind only names,64 some information on 
Muslim slaves survived. For instance, a Muslim named Ayuba Souleyman 
was taken from Gambia and enslaved on a Maryland tobacco plantation.65 
 
 54.  Simpson, supra note 42, at 22, 24. 
 55.  Jennifer Lyn Simpson & Rebecca Brown Adelman, Voice and the “Other”: Interactive 
Theatre As a Model for Education and Liberation on University Campuses, in SOCIAL JUSTICE AND 
COMMUNICATION SCHOLARSHIP 77, 81 (Omar Swartz ed., 2006). 
 56.  Mary Frances Casper, American Dreaming and Cultural Ethnocentrism: A Critical 
Discourse Analysis of the Mythic Discourse in the U.S. State Department’s Shared Values Initiative 71 
(2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, North Dakota State University) (on file with Main Library, 
North Dakota State University). 
 57.  Lauren Berlant, The Face of America and the State of Emergency, in DISCIPLINARITY AND 
DISSENT IN CULTURAL STUDIES 397, 397 (Cary Nelson & Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar eds., 1996). 
 58.  DeWitt, supra note 44, at 7. 
 59.  Simpson & Adelman, supra note 55, at 81. 
 60.  Chidester, supra note 40, at 287. 
 61.  Future U.S. society was not exclusively responsible for this historical othering. Some 
Muslims in Africa participated in the enslavement of different Muslims sent to the future United States. 
ALLAN D. AUSTIN, AFRICAN MUSLIMS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA: A SOURCEBOOK 27 (1984). 
 62.  Samory Rashid, Divergent Perspectives on Islam in America, 20 J. MUSLIM MINORITY AFF. 
75, 75 (2000). 
 63.  AUSTIN, supra note 61, at 32–36; Lansiné Kaba, Americans Discover Islam through the 
Black Muslim Experience, in ISLAM IN NORTH AMERICA: A SOURCEBOOK 25, 26 (Michael A. Köszegi 
& J. Gordon Melton eds., 1992).  
 64.  AUSTIN, supra note 61, at 38. 
 65.  Kaba, supra note 63, at 26. 
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Souleyman impressed his slave masters with his understanding of Arabic.66 
Another Muslim, Saliou Bilalia, was taken from the Bambara capital of 
Segou and, after being enslaved elsewhere, was enslaved on a Georgia 
plantation.67 Since the time of slavery, the Muslim community, othered as 
it was, has remained present in the United States.68 
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. 
Muslims, who make up less than 1 percent of the adult population of a 
country that has an adult population that is at least 75 percent Christian,69 
have suffered especially strong religiously-based discrimination. Indeed, 
U.S. society has continued to construct its Muslim members as Others.70 
Between September 11, 2001, and February 8, 2002, 1717 anti-Muslims 
incidents were reported to the Council on American-Islamic Relations.71 
Since 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice has investigated over 800 
incidents of violence, vandalism, and arson against people the Department 
believed to be Muslim, Arab, or South Asian.72 Examples of this type of 
unlawful activity include a May 2010 pipe bomb that went off in a 
Jacksonville mosque and incidents of vandalism against a Miami-area 
mosque and school, one of which unfolded when bullets were fired into the 
property. 73 According to Assistant U.S. Attorney General for Civil Rights 
 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Brown, supra note 9, at 510. 
 69.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 34. 
 70.  Despite being widespread, this discrimination is somewhat ironic. Islam is part of the 
monotheistic Judeo, Christian, and Islamic tradition with Abrahamic roots. Rashid, supra note 62, at 75. 
 71.  Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1575 n.1 (2002). The 
reports consisted of the following: 289 physical assaults or cases of property damage; 166 cases of 
workplace discrimination; 191 incidents of profiling at the airport; 224 cases of intimidation by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the police, or the Immigration and Naturalization Service; 74 incidents 
of discrimination at school; 315 cases of hate mail; 56 death threats; 16 bomb threats; 372 incidents of 
public harassment; and 11 deaths. Id. 
 72.  US Muslims ‘Face Growing Discrimination’: Anti-Muslim Bigotry Includes Inflammatory 
Rhetoric by Elected Officials, Congressional Panel Is Told, ALJAZEERA.NET (Mar. 29, 2011, 11:53 
PM), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2011/03/2011329195150913510.html [hereinafter US 
Muslims]. The grouping of these categories is itself problematic. For instance, not all Muslims are 
Arabs, and not all Arabs are Muslims. Volpp, supra note 71, at 1576. 
 73.  Damien Cave, Far from Ground Zero, Obscure Pastor Is Ignored No Longer, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/us/26gainesville.html. Also in Florida, a 
Gainesville pastor burned a copy of the Koran after a widely-publicized series of events. Lizette 
Alvarez, Pastor Who Burned Koran Says He Was Duped into Holding Back, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/us/17jones.html. The pastor, Terry Jones, said the following 
about his understanding of the Koran: “I have no experience with it whatsoever. I only know what the 
Bible says.” Cave, supra. 
 
74 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 22:65 
 
Thomas Perez, since 2001, workplace discrimination against Muslims has 
jumped 150 percent.74 
Additionally, opposition to the building of an Islamic community 
center two blocks north of the former site of the World Trade Center 
buildings in Manhattan developed when activists started to denounce the 
plans during the 2010 midterm election cycle.75 The proposed facility 
would contain prayer space, a performing arts center, a restaurant, and a 
pool.76 Even though Muslims died in the World Trade Center attacks, either 
in the buildings themselves or responding to the scene, polling indicated 
that most people in the United States opposed building the facility near 
ground zero.77 Somehow popular sentiment has blamed the Islamic faith for 
the terrorist attacks. 
Protests against Muslim facilities, especially mosques, and the Islamic 
faith itself have taken place around the country.78 For instance, protests 
have occurred in California, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and elsewhere.79 One 
protester in Temecula, California, a mother and grandmother, said, “I don’t 
want them here opening mosques in every city . . . . They don’t belong 
here.”80 Although numerous Muslims are U.S. citizens, they are somehow 
“forever foreign” in the eyes of many non-Muslims.81 
Nearly a decade after September 11, 2001, in March 2011, 
Representative Peter King of New York held a hearing on what he claimed 
to be the radicalization of U.S. Muslims.82 The title for the hearing was 
“The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and 
that Community’s Response.”83 King’s House Homeland Security 
Committee aimed to examine whether the U.S. Muslim community was 
 
 74.  US Muslims, supra note 72. 
 75.  Michael Barbaro, Debate Heats up About Mosque Near Ground Zero, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/31/nyregion/31mosque.html. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  David Schaper, Religious Freedom, Free Speech Face off Nationwide, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Aug. 21, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129330121. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Aziz, supra note 15, at 36. This view of nationality is Eurocentric. Id. at 35. 
 82.  Alan Gomez, Poll: Most Say Congressional Hearings on Muslims Are OK, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 10, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2011-03-09-muslim-congressional-
hearings-poll_N.htm. 
 83.  King to Convene Radicalization Hearing on March 10, U.S. HOUSE OF REPS. (Mar. 4, 2011), 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/ny03_king/conveneradhearing.html. 
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doing enough to help law enforcement capture radicalized Muslims.84 
Critics of the hearing, including various civil rights groups, said that King 
was unfairly singling out Muslims.85 However, according to a USA 
Today/Gallup poll, 52 percent of the U.S. public said the hearing was 
appropriate.86 The same poll indicated that more U.S. citizens believed U.S. 
Muslims were committed to Islam than believed such Muslims were 
supportive of the United States.87 
In addition to King, various other public communicators have 
exploited and cultivated an anti-Islamic sentiment in the country.88 Several 
mainstream political candidates picked up on the anti-Muslim rhetoric.89 
For example, former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Newt 
Gingrich and House Representative Michele Bachmann signed a pledge to 
reject Islamic law, which they described as “totalitarian control.”90 
Gingrich, Bachmann, and former Governor of Alaska Sarah Palin warned 
about a supposed Sharia threat.91 Lieutenant Governor of Tennessee Ron 
Ramsey, who was campaigning for the Republican nomination for 
governor, claimed that Islam was a cult that the First Amendment may not 
protect.92 Marvin Scott, a congressional candidate from Indiana who was 
challenging Representative Andre Carson, then one of two Muslim 
members of Congress, asked at a news conference, “[W]hen are young 
 
 84.  Gomez, supra note 82. 
 85.  Id. Representative Keith Ellison of Minnesota, then one of only two Muslims in the 
Congress, observed, “People’s civil rights cannot be a popularity contest.” Id. He added, “What 
percentage of Americans would say it’s OK to intern Japanese people in 1941?” Id. Several months 
later, Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough warned that casting a shadow of suspicion 
on the whole Muslim community regarding terrorist activity might “feed the sense of disenchantment 
and disenfranchisement that may spur violent extremist radicalization.” Scott Shane, To Fight Radical 
Islam, U.S. Wants Muslim Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/04/us/04extreme.html.  
 86.  Gomez, supra note 82. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Cave, supra note 73.  
 89.  Id. See also Schaper, supra note 78. 
 90.  Elliott, supra note 4. 
 91.  Who’s Behind the Movement to Ban Shariah Law?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/08/09/139168699/whos-behind-the-movement-to-ban-shariah-law. Not all 
Republicans have agreed with this rhetoric. For example, Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey, who 
nominated Sohail Mohammed, a Muslim, to the state’s superior court, faced criticism because of his 
nominee’s religion. Wayne Parry, NJ Muslim: From 9/11 Detainee Lawyer to Judge, STAR TRIBUNE, 
July 31, 2011, http://www.startribune.com/printarticle/?id=126484173. In response to the criticism, 
Christie replied, “This Sharia law business is crap; it’s crazy and I’m tired of dealing with crazies. I’m 
happy he’s willing to serve after all this baloney.” Id. 
 92.  Schaper, supra note 78. 
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people indoctrinated into the Muslim ideal and how much are they willing 
to carry out? I mean, it’s no different than the Japanese kamikazes.”93 
Oklahoma has not excused Muslims from the othering process. After 
Muneer Awad, an Oklahoma Muslim, filed a lawsuit over SQ 755, 
claiming the amendment violated his constitutional right to religious 
freedom,94 large mosques in Oklahoma City and Tulsa received a flood of 
hateful e-mail.95 One individual sent a video of a man who was destroying 
a mosque.96 Awad himself received “an avalanche of hate mail” for filing 
the lawsuit.97 
Despite the absence of any strong evidence to support a connection, 
many people in the United States have tried to make a connection between 
the practices of average U.S. Muslims and the actions of terrorists,98 
somehow seeing “an encroaching Islamic threat.”99 Although the 
September 11 attackers claimed to be Muslim,100 some of the civilians 
killed in the attacks were Muslim themselves.101 Of note, while U.S. 
society has constructed Muslims as Others, particularly after the September 
11 attacks, the same society did not construct White people as Others 
following the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City.102 Timothy McVeigh, the individual primarily responsible for the 
1995 bombing, was White.103 Society chose to think of McVeigh “as an 
individual deviant, a bad actor,” not representative of any larger group.104 
However, the same society has chosen to think of the September 11 
 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  See infra Section III. 
 95.  James C. McKinley, Jr., Oklahoma Surprise: Islam as an Election Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/us/15oklahoma.html. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Leah Nelson, Oklahoma’s Shariah Law Ban Creates Controversy, SPLC INTELLIGENCE 
REPORT, Spring 2011, available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-
all-issues/2011/spring/oklahoma-shariah-law-ban-creates-controversy. 
 98.  States Move, supra note 28. 
 99.  The Law of the Land, 97 A.B.A. J. 14 (May 2011). 
 100.  Somehow extremists often manage to speak on behalf of a group, perhaps because more 
moderate voices within the group do not speak up. Takim, supra note 35, at 343. 
 101.  Jonathan K. Stubbs, The Bottom Rung of America’s Race Ladder: After the September 11 
Catastrophe Are American Muslims Becoming America’s New N . . . . s?, 19 J. L. & RELIG. 115, 120 
(2003–04). In solidarity with their fellow citizens after September 11, many Muslims put up U.S. flags 
at their mosques, on their homes, and in their cars. Takim, supra note 35, at 344. 
 102.  Stubbs, supra note 101, at 122–23. 
 103.  Id. at 123. 
 104.  Volpp, supra note 71, at 1584–85.  
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attackers, who claimed to be Muslim, as representatives of Islam.105 As one 
might expect, a Gallup poll indicated that 53 percent of the U.S. public had 
an opinion on Islam that was “not too favorable” or “not favorable at 
all.”106 
This type of associational rhetoric has taken its toll on Muslims in the 
United States. For example, 53 percent of U.S. Muslims reported that, since 
the September 11 attacks, being Muslim in the United States was harder 
than before the attacks.107 Unlike other individuals in the United States, 
who are often worried about economic and employment problems, 
Muslims state that their biggest problems are discrimination, being viewed 
as terrorists, ignorance of Islam, and negative stereotyping.108 Additionally, 
54 percent of Muslims believe that, in its antiterrorism effort, the 
government targets them “for increased surveillance and monitoring.”109 
Politicians, looking for issues to mobilize voters, have exploited for 
political advantage the perception that Islam is “inherently violent and 
incompatible with Western values and norms.”110 Reflecting on the 
effectiveness of this type of political rhetoric, Muslim scholar Reza Aslan 
observed, “I cannot think of a time in which anti-Islamic sentiment has 
been higher than it is today.”111 Human rights lawyer Arsalan Iftikhar, 
himself a Muslim, added, “We’re starting to feel like strangers in a strange 
land now . . . .”112 Although many state legislators are attorneys and thus 
should know better, they chose to propose and discuss law that would 
violate the U.S. Constitution, particularly with regard to the rights of 
individuals. This was the case in Oklahoma. 
 
 105.  Id. at 1585. 
 106.  GALLUP, RELIGIOUS PERCEPTIONS IN AMERICA: WITH AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF U.S. 
ATTITUDES TOWARD MUSLIMS AND ISLAM 8 (2009). In the same poll, 63 percent of the public admitted 
to having “very little knowledge” of Islam or “none at all.” Id. at 9. People who are prejudiced against a 
group often know little about that group. Emily Kalled Lovell, A Survey of Arab-Muslims in the United 
States and Canada, in ISLAM IN NORTH AMERICA: A SOURCEBOOK 59, 61 (Michael A. Köszegi & J. 
Gordon Melton eds., 1992). 
 107.  PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 34, at 35. 
 108.  Id. at 36. 
 109.  Id. Many non-Muslims in the United States see this phenomenon in the same way as their 
Muslim counterparts do; 45 percent of non-Muslims believe that, in its counterterrorism effort, the 
government targets Muslims. Id. 
 110.  Takim, supra note 35, at 344. 
 111.  Schaper, supra note 78. 
 112.  Id. 
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III. SQ 755 AND ENSUING LITIGATION 
Oklahoma State Representative Rex Duncan and State Senator 
Anthony Sykes, the main legislative sponsors of SQ 755,113 called the 
question the “Save Our State Amendment.”114 In May 2010, SQ 755 passed 
in the Oklahoma House of Representatives by a vote of 91-2 and in the 
Oklahoma Senate by a vote of 41-2.115 SQ 755, which would have 
amended Article VII, Section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution, included the 
following language: 
The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when exercising 
their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in 
the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United 
States Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, established 
common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant 
thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United States 
provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making 
judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other 
nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider international 
law or Sharia Law. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all 
cases before the respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of 
first impression.116 
Some concern developed regarding the ballot title of SQ 755. In 
Oklahoma, the ballot title of a proposed constitutional amendment is 
important because a court considers the title in interpreting the measure, 
regardless of whether the text of the measure is vague.117 Originally, the 
ballot title was as follows: 
This measure amends the State Constitution. It would change a section 
that deals with the courts of this state. It would make courts rely on 
federal and state laws when deciding cases. It would forbid courts from 
looking at international law or Sharia Law when deciding cases.118 
On June 2, 2010, Oklahoma Attorney General W. A. Drew Edmondson 
wrote a letter to Oklahoma Secretary of State M. Susan Savage, Oklahoma 
Senate President Pro Tempore Glenn Coffee, and Oklahoma House of 
 
 113.  Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Oklahoma’s Anti-Shariah Law Put on Hold, For Now, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=131168920.  
 114.  H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., § 1(B) (Okla. 2010). 
 115.  John R. Crook, Oklahoma to Hold November 2010 Referendum on Constitutional 
Amendment Banning State Courts from Applying International and Sharia Law, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 
658, 658 n.2 (2010). 
 116.  Okla. H.R.J. Res. 1056 § 1(C). 
 117.  Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Okla. State Bd. of Equalization, 231 P.3d 638, 642 (Okla. 2009). 
 118.  Okla. H.R.J. Res. 1056 § 2.  
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Representatives Speaker Chris Benge, notifying them that the Attorney 
General’s office believed that the title of SQ 755 was unlawful.119 
According to the Attorney General, SQ 755 did “not adequately explain the 
effect of the proposition because it [did] not explain what either Sharia Law 
or international law” was.120 Two days later, the Attorney General 
submitted a revised ballot title to the same three state officers.121 The new 
ballot title stated the following: 
This measure amends the State Constitution. It changes a section that 
deals with the courts of this state. It would amend Article 7, Section 1. It 
makes courts rely on federal and state law when deciding cases. It forbids 
courts from considering or using international law. It forbids courts from 
considering or using Sharia Law. 
International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals with the 
conduct of international organizations and independent nations, such as 
countries, states and tribes. It deals with their relationship with each other. 
It also deals with some of their relationships with persons. 
The law of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized nations. 
Sources of international law also include international agreements, as well 
as treaties. 
Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources, the Koran 
and the teaching of Mohammed.122 
Nearly three weeks later, the Attorney General sent the three state 
officers mentioned above a letter that confirmed his acceptance of the 
amended ballot title.123 The same day, Secretary of State Savage sent 
SQ 755 to Governor Brad Henry124 and Secretary of the State Election 
Board Paul Ziriax.125 On August 9, 2010, Governor Henry declared that 
 
 119.  See Letter from W. A. Drew Edmondson, Okla. Att’y Gen., to M. Susan Savage, Okla. 
Sec’y of State; Glenn Coffee, Okla. Senate Pres. Pro Tempore; and Chris Benge, Okla. House of Reps. 
Speaker (June 2, 2010), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See Letter from W. A. Drew Edmondson, Okla. Att’y Gen., to M. Susan Savage, Okla. 
Sec’y of State; Glenn Coffee, Okla. Senate Pres. Pro Tempore; and Chris Benge, Okla. House of Reps. 
Speaker (June 4, 2010), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf. 
 122.  Okla. H.R.J. Res. 1056 § 2. 
 123.  See Letter from W. A. Drew Edmondson, Okla. Att’y Gen., to M. Susan Savage, Okla. 
Sec’y of State; Glenn Coffee, Okla. Senate Pres. Pro Tempore; and Chris Benge, Okla. House of Reps. 
Speaker (June 24, 2010), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf. 
 124.  See Letter from M. Susan Savage, Okla. Att’y Gen., to Brad Henry, Okla. Governor (June 
24, 2010), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf. 
 125.  See Letter from M. Susan Savage, Okla. Att’y Gen., to Paul Ziriax, Sec’y Okla. State 
Election Bd. (June 24, 2010), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf. 
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SQ 755 would be submitted to the electorate at the next election.126 On 
November 2, 2010, SQ 755 passed with the support of over 70 percent of 
the voting public.127 
Two days later, on November 4, 2010, Muneer Award, head of the 
Oklahoma chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, and 
himself a Muslim, challenged SQ 755 in the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Oklahoma, asserting that SQ 755 violated his religious 
freedom.128 Awad asked Judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange to grant initially a 
temporary restraining order and then a preliminary injunction against 
Defendants Paul Ziriax, Thomas Prince, Ramon Watkins, and Susan 
Turpen (collectively “Defendants”), all of whom were members of the 
Oklahoma State Board of Elections, that would prevent them from 
certifying the election results for SQ 755.129 On November 9, 2010, Judge 
Miles-LaGrange granted Awad’s request for a temporary restraining 
order,130 and on November 29, 2010, she granted his request for a 
preliminary injunction.131 
On December 1, 2010, the Defendants provided notice that they would 
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.132 A three-judge 
panel of the Tenth Circuit, which consisted of Scott Matheson, Terrence 
O’Brien, and Monroe McKay, heard oral argument on September 12, 2011, 
and issued its unanimous decision on January 10, 2012.133 Speaking for the 
panel, Judge Matheson concluded that the district court had not abused its 
discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.134 
 
 126.  See Brad Henry, Okla. Governor, Exec. Proclamation (Aug. 9, 2010), available at 
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf. 
 127.  Hagerty, supra note 113. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301–02 (W.D. Okla. 2010). 
 130.  Awad v. Ziriax, No. CIV-10-1186-M, 2010 WL 4676996, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 9, 2010). 
 131.  Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1308. 
  On his website, Senator Anthony Sykes attempted to justify the anti-Sharia amendment, 
claiming, “They certainly don’t respect equal treatment regardless of gender in Shariah law.” Hagerty, 
supra note 113. He added, “They’re very abusive and downright ill-treat women as unequal citizens in 
Shariah law, and we certainly don’t want that here in America.” Id. 
  Muneer Awad responded to that position, noting, “It’s a ridiculous and offensive stereotype, 
an attempt to capitalize on the fears of people who don’t know anything about Islam.” Id. He continued, 
“We already have laws that prevent violence against women: You can’t engage in a crime and consider 
it somehow related to your faith.” Id. 
 132.  Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 133.  Id. at 1116, 1119. 
 134.  Id. at 1133. 
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS THAT RESULT FROM 
OTHERING MUSLIMS THROUGH SQ 755 
In its attempt to other Oklahoma Muslims, SQ 755 violates the U.S. 
Constitution for a variety of reasons. Specifically, SQ 755 offends the 
Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Contracts 
Clause. Some of the constitutional violations directly harm Muslims; other 
violations do not. This section of the paper will examine how the law 
violates each clause noted. 
A. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE VIOLATION 
SQ 755 violates the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, which 
provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion.”135 The Establishment Clause also protects against action by the 
states.136 If a law purportedly discriminates based on religious 
denomination, “the initial inquiry is whether the law facially differentiates 
among religions.”137 If the law facially discriminates among religions, strict 
scrutiny applies, and the government must show a compelling interest and 
that the law “is closely fitted to further that interest.”138 However, if a law 
does not facially discriminate against a religious group, a three-part 
analysis takes place under the Lemon test.139 A seemingly neutral law 
violates the Establishment Clause if (1) the law lacks “a secular legislative 
purpose,” (2) the “principal or primary effect” of the law “advances [or] 
inhibits religion,” or (3) the law fosters “an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.”140 To be unconstitutional, a law only needs to 
violate one prong of the Lemon test.141 
Strict scrutiny analysis and the Lemon test are not mutually exclusive. 
Indeed, the two analytic approaches overlap to a notable degree, 
particularly with regard to the first two prongs of the Lemon test.142 If a law 
 
 135.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 136.  Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment Clause). 
 137.  Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989). 
 138.  Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246–47 (1982).  
 139.  Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 695. 
 140.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). Although several justices on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in particular Justice Antonin Scalia, have called for the Lemon test to be overruled, 
such overruling has not yet occurred. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 1246 (4th ed. 2011). 
 141.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 1246. 
 142.  Id. at 1245. 
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targets one type of religious group for discrimination, the law is likely to 
lack a secular legislative purpose because the members of the body that 
passed the law probably belong to more established religious groups. Also, 
the law likely will have a primary effect of inhibiting the targeted religious 
group and thus advancing more established religious groups. 
Under either strict scrutiny analysis or the Lemon test, SQ 755 would 
violate the Establishment Clause. The ensuing two subsections demonstrate 
how. 
1. SQ 755 Fails Strict Scrutiny Analysis 
SQ 755 discriminates on its face against Muslims, and thus strict 
scrutiny would apply. The amendment specifically references that “the 
courts shall not consider . . . Sharia Law” and that state courts can consider 
the law of another state of the United States only if “the law of the other 
state does not include Sharia Law.”143 Sharia is based on the traditions of 
Muslims. If one were to doubt that, the amendment adds that “Sharia Law 
is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources, the Koran and the 
teaching of Mohammed.”144 
For the law to survive strict scrutiny analysis, Oklahoma would need 
to show a compelling interest and that SQ 755 would be necessary to 
promote that interest, but the state can make no such showing.145 One 
possibility for a compelling interest, at which the text of SQ 755 hints, is 
protecting the state from Islamic influence. However, such an interest 
would be flagrant discrimination against a religious minority group. No one 
has made a serious argument that Oklahoma courts have decided numerous 
 
 143.  H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., § 1(C) (Okla. 2010). 
 144.  Id. § 2. 
 145.  In a different constitutional context, that of the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court 
has explained how discrimination against a minority group can fail to withstand even the low standard 
of rational basis review. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The Court noted how a Colorado 
constitutional amendment that discriminated against gays and lesbians “raise[d] the inevitable inference 
that the disadvantage imposed [was] born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.” Id. at 634. 
The Court went on to say that the idea of equal protection of the laws “must at the very least mean that 
a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental 
interest.” Id. at 634–35 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). Consequently, 
in discriminating against Muslims, proponents of SQ 755, who face the challenge of withstanding strict 
scrutiny analysis, would be unlikely to succeed. 
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cases based on Sharia to the detriment of either the state judiciary or the 
public.146 
A more serious possibility for a compelling interest, particularly after 
September 11, would be protecting the public from terrorism.147 However, 
how keeping Sharia and Islamic traditions out of Oklahoma courts, such as 
in the cases of mediation or arbitration, would reduce terrorism is unclear. 
The connection between terrorism and Islam is too weak. No one has 
proven that most rank-and-file U.S. Muslims are more violent than rank-
and-file adherents of other religious traditions. The law captures a whole 
religious group because a few of its extreme adherents are dangerous. A 
law necessary to achieve an interest in protecting the public from terrorism 
would target terrorists, regardless of their supposed religious beliefs, not 
Muslims in general. Accordingly, in the absence of a compelling interest 
where the law is necessary to achieve that interest, SQ 755 violates the 
Establishment Clause. 
2. SQ 755 Fails the Lemon Test 
Even if SQ 755 did not facially discriminate against Muslims,148 the 
amendment still would violate the Establishment Clause because the 
amendment would fail the Lemon test. First, the law lacks a secular 
purpose, in violation of the first prong of the Lemon test. On its face, the 
law does a poor job of pretending to be secular in nature. Although the law 
may seek to prevent the Oklahoma courts from “look[ing] to the legal 
precepts of other nations or cultures,” SQ 755 then adds that “the courts 
shall not consider international law or Sharia Law.”149 SQ 755 also states 
that courts can consider the law of another state only if “the law of the 
other state does not include Sharia Law.”150 Specifically, because the law 
has the purpose of prohibiting the intersection of the courts and the 
religious traditions of Muslims, the purpose of the law is not secular in 
nature. 
 
 146.  At the preliminary injunction hearing, counsel for the Defendants was unaware of even one 
instance in which an Oklahoma court had applied Sharia. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 
(W.D. Okla. 2010). 
 147.  The Tenth Circuit was unable to identify a compelling state interest for SQ 755, so the court 
could not evaluate whether such a state interest was closely fitted to the law in question. Awad v. 
Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1130–31 (10th Cir. 2012). The court commented, “One cannot try on a glove to 
see if it fits when the glove is missing.” Id. 
 148.  Appellants argued that Sharia was just one example of religious law banned in state courts 
under SQ 755. Id. at 1128. 
 149.  H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., § 1(C) (Okla. 2010). 
 150.  Id. 
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When one is determining whether SQ 755 has a secular purpose, 
looking at the statements made by the legislators who wanted to reduce the 
potential influence of Sharia can be helpful. Public statements, including 
those made to the news media, can shed insight on the purpose of the 
members of the legislature, and a court considers such statements in 
determining whether a purpose is secular.151 Although official legislative 
intent in Oklahoma is rare,152 Oklahoma State Representative Rex Duncan, 
a key author and sponsor of what became SQ 755, offered detailed insight 
into the unofficial purpose of SQ 755 by focusing on Islam and Sharia, 
particularly in his communications with the news media. Before the 
November 2010 election, Duncan stated that SQ 755 would “constitute a 
pre-emptive strike against Sharia law coming to Oklahoma.”153 He 
declared, “Oklahomans recognize that America was founded on Judeo-
Christian values, and we’re unapologetically grateful that God has blessed 
America and blessed Oklahoma.”154 Duncan asserted that the amendment 
was “just a simple effort to ensure that our courts are not used to undermine 
those founding principles and turn Oklahoma into something that our 
founding fathers and our great-grandparents wouldn’t recognize.”155 
According to Duncan, without SQ 755, Muslims would locate “a backdoor 
way to get Sharia Law in the courts.”156 Duncan believed that the United 
States was in “a cultural war, . . . a social war, . . . [and] a war for the 
survival of [the] country.”157 
The purpose of SQ 755 also can be understood through consideration 
of interest group rhetoric in favor of the law. During the 2010 election 
campaign, Act! For America, a group that strongly supported the 
amendment in a very public way, claimed that SQ 755 would prevent the 
 
 151.  See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851 (2005); 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591–93 (1987). The asserted purpose that a court identifies must 
be genuine and “not a sham.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864. 
 152.  See Resources Regarding Oklahoma’s Legislative Measures, ODL Online, 
http://www.odl.state.ok.us/lawinfo/billinfo.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 
 153.  Gale Courey Toensing, Oklahoma Lawmakers Aim to Ban International and Sharia Law 
from State Courts, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Oct. 26, 2010, 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ictarchives/2010/10/26/oklahoma-lawmakers-aim-to-ban-
international-and-sharia-law-from-state-courts-81581.  
 154.  Nelson, supra note 97. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Oklahoma Lawmaker Wants Sharia Law Banned, FOXNEWS.COM (June 21, 2010), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,595026,00.html. 
 157.  Nelson, supra note 97. 
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takeover of Oklahoma by Muslim extremists.158 Act! For America radio 
commercials advised audiences that Sharia had begun infiltrating the 
United States.159 In a radio commercial, the narrator discussed what was 
supposed to be “just one chilling example of how Islamic Shariah law ha[d] 
begun to penetrate America.”160 In an interview, Brigitte Gabriel, the leader 
of Act! For America, stated, “We want to make sure that the people in 
Oklahoma are educated about what Shariah law is all about and its 
ramifications.”161 Gabriel warned of the need “to make sure women 
[would] be protected from Shariah law.”162 
Letters to the editor during the 2010 election cycle also focused on the 
concern of alleged infiltration of Islamic law into the United States, and 
such letters offer insight into the purpose of SQ 755 as some of the voters 
who supported the amendment understood it.163 For example, one writer 
asserted that voting against SQ 755 would help “Islamists in their ‘stealth 
jihad,’ an ongoing, insidious effort to surreptitiously retool the United 
States into an Islamic nation.”164 The same writer claimed that Sharia was 
“already creeping into the United States” and that it was “only a matter of 
time until it [came] to Oklahoma.”165 Another writer asked, “By the way, 
haven’t you heard enough about Muslims lately, with the mosque near 
ground zero? That’s a slap in the face of every American. So, vote yes on 
 
 158.  Stephen Clark, Group Launches Media Blitz in Oklahoma for Anti-Shariah Ballot Initiative, 
FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/10/20/anti-islamic-group-
launches-media-blitz-oklahoma-anti-shariah-ballot-initiative. Act! For America spent $60,000 to 
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 159.  Ben Smith & Byron Tau, Anti-Islamic Groups Go Mainstream, POLITICO, Mar. 7, 2011, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/50837.html. 
 160.  Clark, supra note 158. The example used in the radio advertisement was of a New Jersey 
family court judge’s decision against granting a restraining order to a woman who had been repeatedly 
sexually abused by her husband; the husband believed he was acting according to his Muslim faith. Id. 
The advertisement did not mention that the decision was overturned on appeal. Id. See also S.D. v. 
M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 161.  Clark, supra note 158. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  The letters to the editor cited in this Article come from the newspaper the Tulsa World. 
Tulsa is the second largest city in Oklahoma. U.S. Census Bureau Delivers Oklahoma’s 2010 Census 
Population Totals, Including First Look at Race and Hispanic Origin Data for Legislative Redistricting, 
U.S. CENSUS 2010 (Feb. 15, 2011), http://2010.census.gov/news/releases/operations/cb11-cn33.html. 
 164.  Joe A. Putnam, Letter to the Editor, SQ 755 Supported, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 27, 2010, 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/opinion/article.aspx?subjectid=62&articleid=20101027_62_A16_Oppone4
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 165.  Id. 
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SQ 755.”166 Referencing Muslims and their faith, a different editorialist 
maintained that there were “millions of Americans who [would] not 
tolerate these kinds of godless laws and practices.”167 The editorialist 
“urge[d] all Oklahomans to embrace SQ 755.”168 He concluded, “Yes to 
freedom, and no to tyranny.”169 A few days after the election, another 
individual declared, “If [Muslims] think that they can’t practice Islam 
without Shariah law in force, then let them go back to an Islamic 
country.”170 He added, “May God help us if the Muslims win this fight.”171 
As one can see from the text of the amendment, the rhetoric of a key 
author and sponsor of the amendment in the Oklahoma Legislature, and 
various supporting rhetorics from the 2010 election cycle, SQ 755 lacks a 
secular purpose. The purpose is to discriminate against Muslims based on 
their faith. 
Second, the law would have the primary effect of advancing non-
Muslim religions and inhibiting Islam. Specifically, the law would advance 
Christian denominations. SQ 755 is a form of symbolic endorsement, 
which creates the impression that the government favors a particular 
religious tradition or traditions.172 In a state like Oklahoma, where the 
population is less than 1 percent Muslim,173 if the government restricts the 
influence of one religion, Islam, then other religions would receive an 
implied endorsement from the state government. Christian denominations, 
already approximately 89 percent of the state population,174 would benefit. 
In targeting Islam, a supposedly dangerous religion, the law sends a 
 
 166.  Wayne Shearhart, Letter to the Editor, For SQ 751, 755, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 7, 2010, 
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 168.  Id. 
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 170.  Phil Essley, Letter to the Editor, Shariah Law is a Problem, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 13, 2010, 
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message that untargeted religious traditions are not dangerous and thus are 
safe. Safe religions are presumably good. Even though “one religious 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another,”175 if the 
government expresses its disapproval of Islam, but not of other religious 
groups, that would constitute an implied statement of preference. 
The opposite side of the advancement and inhibition coin is that the 
law would inhibit the practice of Islam, also in violation of the second 
prong of the Lemon test. SQ 755 prohibits courts from 
“consider[ing] . . . Sharia Law.”176 Since Sharia is a part of Islam, SQ 755 
would prevent state courts from considering aspects of Islam in cases 
where this type of consideration would be appropriate, such as enforcing 
mediations or arbitrations. In taking an anti-Muslim stance, the state 
government violates the idea that the government should remain neutral 
regarding religious practice. 
Oddly enough, a primary effect of SQ 755 would be to contradict the 
Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act (“ORFA”). The ORFA prohibits the 
government from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s free exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”177 
Under the ORFA, the government must show that the substantial burden on 
free exercise of religion is essential to furthering a compelling state interest 
and the least restrictive means for furthering that interest.178 SQ 755 would 
have the primary effect of impacting a Muslim who wanted to sue for a 
violation of the ORFA by preventing him or her from doing so because the 
state court could not consider the Muslim’s religion, which, by definition, 
would draw upon Sharia. Thus, state government would inhibit the practice 
of Islam. 
Third, the law promotes excessive government entanglement with 
religion, in violation of the third prong of the Lemon test. A range of 
conceptions of Sharia exists,179 and because it lacks a central authority,180 
 
 175.  Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). 
 176.  H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., § 1(C) (Okla. 2010). 
 177.  OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 253(A) (2012). 
 178.  Id. §§ 253(B)(1), (B)(2). 
 179.  Dominic McGoldrick, Accommodating Muslims in Europe: From Adopting Sharia Law to 
Religiously Based Opt Outs from Generally Applicable Laws, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 603, 605 (2009). 
McGoldrick notes that Sharia “can be understood as an abstract philosophical concept or overarching 
meta-norm approximating to the rule of law. Alternatively, it can be understood as more of a moral 
conception . . . .” Id. To devout Muslims, Sharia has a “moral and metaphysical purpose.” Id. Sharia 
also “can be more narrowly conceived as embodying Islamically derived rules and norms” or even “as a 
flexible general system of law (like common law or civil law).” Id. at 606. 
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Sharia has several different schools of interpretation.181 Sunni Muslims 
have schools of interpretation called Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali; 
Shia Muslims have a school of interpretation called Ithna Ashari.182 With 
different traditions in different countries and various schools of religious 
thought, Sharia would prove especially problematic for Oklahoma courts, 
which, in determining whether something really was a form of Sharia,183 
would have to interpret religious law.184 Also, if courts had to determine 
whether out-of-state law was based on Sharia, they again would be 
determining what constituted Sharia. The revised ballot title for SQ 755 
stated only that “Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal 
sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.”185 Without further 
guidance, state courts would not know the details of the Koran or 
Muhammad’s teachings. The courts would have to make inquiries to find 
out, and excessive government entanglement with religion would result. 
Therefore, because SQ 755 lacks a secular purpose, would have the 
primary effect of advancing and inhibiting religion, and would promote 
excessive entanglement between government and religion, the law fails all 
three prongs of the Lemon test. As such, even if the amendment were not 
facially discriminatory, it still would violate the Establishment Clause. 
B. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE VIOLATION 
In addition to violating the Establishment Clause, SQ 755 violates the 
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, which provides that “Congress 
shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”186 The 
Free Exercise Clause also protects against action by the states.187 A 
 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Thornback, supra note 14, at 5. 
 182.  Id. at 4. Of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims, 85 percent are Sunni, and 15 percent are Shia. 
Aziz, supra note 15, at 45. 
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of Sharia and the same court’s enforcing a mediation agreement that the parties claim is based on 
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 187.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise Clause). 
 
2012] Constructing the Other 89 
 
challenge under the Free Exercise Clause must include proof that a law 
burdens one’s ability to practice one’s religion. When a law targets 
religion, the law undergoes strict scrutiny analysis.188 Then government 
must have a compelling interest for the law, and the law must be narrowly 
tailored in reaching that interest.189 If a facially neutral law of general 
applicability merely impacts someone’s free exercise of religion, the law 
receives only rational basis review.190 In that case, government must have a 
legitimate purpose, and the means used must be rationally related to 
furthering that purpose.191 
Regardless of whether strict scrutiny analysis or rational basis review 
applied, SQ 755 would violate the Free Exercise Clause. The ensuing two 
subsections explain how. 
1. SQ 755 Fails Strict Scrutiny Analysis 
Because SQ 755 prohibits Oklahoma state courts from considering 
Sharia, the amendment would impact Muslims’ free exercise of religion in 
a variety of ways. For example, some Muslims may choose to arbitrate 
their contractual disputes according to Sharia.192 Also, Muslims may want 
to use Sharia-based arbitration boards or mediations in divorce or child 
custody matters.193 Under SQ 755, these scenarios would not be possible, 
as Oklahoma courts would be prohibited from considering Sharia. 
 
 188.  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993). 
 189.  Id. 
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choose to have their disputes arbitrated under Sharia and have a provincial court enforce the decision. 
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note 9, at 545; Jews, Muslims to Fight for Tribunals, CBC NEWS (Sept. 14, 2005), 
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Sharia Councils Spark Debate in Britain, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 27, 2008), 
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authority to enforce their decisions. Growing Use of Sharia by UK Muslims, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16522447. 
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Additionally, Sharia places significance upon having a written will,194 
which was one of the issues in the Awad case.195 Mr. Awad claimed that 
SQ 755 would impact how a court would oversee the probating of his 
Sharia-based will.196 
In general, as long as Sharia-based provisions of a document, such as 
a will, did not violate secular law, the Sharia provisions would be 
enforceable. This is so because civil courts in the United States have 
accepted similar religious provisions based, for example, on Judaism that 
did not violate secular law.197 As with mediation or arbitration in general, 
the court would want to verify that the process, regardless of the tradition 
involved, was voluntary and consensual.198 With no state court available to 
consider contractual arbitration, probate, and family law matters that Sharia 
has influenced, Muslims would suffer a detrimental impact to their ability 
to exercise their religion freely. 
The protections of the Free Exercise Clause apply when the law in 
question “discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or 
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons,”199 and 
SQ 755 discriminates against Islam. The language of SQ 755 reads, 
“Specifically, the courts shall not consider . . . Sharia Law.”200 The 
amendment also states that Oklahoma courts may consider “the law of 
another state of the United States provided the law of the other state does 
not include Sharia Law.”201 Nowhere does the amendment mention any 
other faiths such as Judaism or Christianity. In terms of religion, the 
amendment focuses only on Sharia, or Islamic law, which means that the 
law targets adherents of Islam. 
 
 194.  Mohammedi, supra note 33, at 59. 
 195.  Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010). 
 196.  Compl. TRO & Prelim. Inj. at 7–8, Awad v. Ziriax, No. CIV-10-1186-M (W.D. Okla. Nov. 
4, 2010). 
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usually enforce the decisions. Id. 
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in Islamic alternative dispute resolution processes. Id. at 636–37. While this may be a concern in some 
cases, the argument is not unique. Other religious traditions are not free from sexism. Thornback, supra 
note 14, at 7–8. 
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 200.  H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., § 1(C) (Okla. 2010). 
 201.  Id. 
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Consequently, Oklahoma must show that SQ 755 supports a 
compelling state interest and that the means used are narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest. In this case, the government has no clearly articulated 
compelling interest. Given the remarks of Representative Duncan noted 
above, one might think that the asserted government interest would be 
protecting Oklahoma from Islam. For example, Duncan expressed his 
belief that the United States was in “a cultural war, . . . a social 
war, . . . [and] a war for the survival of [the] country.”202 However, the state 
has no interest in taking sides in a so-called “culture war,” particularly 
when the sides to the supposed “war” would be religious groups, and the 
government’s promoting a particular religious view would violate 
government neutrality toward religion. Moreover, no one has made a 
serious case that Oklahoma courts have decided cases based on Sharia to 
the detriment of either the state judiciary or the public.203 Protecting 
Oklahoma from Islam is discrimination against a religious minority group, 
not a compelling state interest. 
In light of the September 11 terrorist attacks, as well as other terrorist 
attacks on the United States and its allies, protecting the public from 
terrorism is a compelling state interest. Proponents of SQ 755 may 
advocate that, since terrorism is a serious problem and some terrorists 
claim to be Muslim, passing laws that restrict an aspect of Islam such as 
Sharia would reduce terrorism. To the contrary, and on a more logical 
level, the connection between terrorism and Islam is weak. Rank-and-file 
Muslims in the United States who attend Friday prayer services at their 
local mosques are not terrorists; members of Al-Qaeda are. SQ 755 
captures an entire religious group because a few of its extreme adherents 
are dangerous. A narrowly tailored law would target terrorists, regardless 
of their purported religious beliefs, not Muslims in general. Nonetheless, 
how prohibiting the consideration of Sharia in state courts would combat 
terrorism remains unclear. Consequently, the government either lacks a 
clearly articulated compelling interest, or, if the government had such an 
interest, the means used would not be narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest. Thus, SQ 755 violates the Free Exercise Clause. 
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2. SQ 755 Fails Rational Basis Review 
Even if SQ 755 did not specifically target Muslims,204 the law would 
fail to withstand rational basis review. For a serious state interest like 
protecting the public from terrorism, which easily would be legitimate, the 
government would be unable to show how keeping Sharia out of state 
courts reasonably would protect members of the public from terrorism. As 
noted above, no one has demonstrated that most Muslims, adherents of 
various forms of Sharia, are terrorists. The actual terrorists, like members 
of Al-Qaeda, have no history of practicing terrorism through infiltration of 
state court systems. Rather, terrorists engage in image events, or visually-
gripping activities that, through dissemination in the mass media, draw 
attention to particular causes.205 For instance, terrorists inflict violence 
upon people and landmarks, as members of Al-Qaeda did on September 11. 
Taking over a state court system through discourse, even if that were 
possible, would not draw attention to terrorists’ causes because almost no 
one in the general public would notice. Most of the rhetoric of the court 
system is within the technical sphere of the law,206 a sphere which judges, 
lawyers, and support staff inhabit. The governmental means used would be 
unreasonable and simply based on a general fear of terrorism and a lack of 
understanding of the Islamic faith.207 Accordingly, under rational basis 
review, as under strict scrutiny analysis, SQ 755 would offend the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
On a related statutory note, in contradiction to the Oklahoma 
Religious Freedom Act, SQ 755 would impact negatively a Muslim’s 
ability to exercise his or her faith freely. Since SQ 755 would prohibit state 
courts from “consider[ing] . . . Sharia Law,”208 the courts would be unable 
to hear the case of a Muslim who had suffered governmental discrimination 
based on faith. This would be the situation even though, under Oklahoma 
 
 204.  Appellants argued that Sharia was only one example of religious law banned in state courts 
under SQ 755. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1128 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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law, the government should have to prove a compelling state interest to 
justify interfering with the practice of a Muslim’s, or anyone else’s, 
religion and demonstrate that the means used to promote the interest were 
the least restrictive.209 Especially in the case of socially less-favored 
religions, free exercise of religion can become the target of discrimination, 
and, in the absence of suitable legal recourse, the free exercise of religion 
becomes weaker. 
C. SUPREMACY CLAUSE VIOLATION 
Outside of the First Amendment realm, SQ 755 violates the 
Supremacy Clause of Article VI. The Supremacy Clause proclaims that “all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”210 Treaties can be self-
executory or executory. Self-executory treaties do not require 
implementing legislation by both houses of Congress before they take 
effect; such treaties take effect immediately on ratification by the Senate.211 
As Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, a valid self-executing treaty has “to 
be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature.”212 
In contrast, executory treaties require implementing legislation by both 
houses of Congress before such treaties take effect.213 
A valid treaty overrides conflicting state law.214 This is true of either a 
self-executory treaty or an executory treaty for which Congress has passed 
implementing legislation. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated 
that states must adhere to treaties,215 and that the Tenth Amendment does 
not limit the federal treaty power.216 Moreover, the Supremacy Clause 
requires that, regardless of any contrary state law, state judges are bound by 
the terms of treaties to which the United States is a party.217 
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282 (1796). See also Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003) (“Generally, then, valid 
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One of the key ideas behind the Supremacy Clause, which SQ 755 
ignores, was to ensure that states would honor treaties to which the United 
States was a party.218 This notion dates back to the period after the 
Revolutionary War, when some states refused to honor the Treaty of 
Paris.219 Although the Treaty of Paris guaranteed that the law would not bar 
the collection of war-related debts, states passed laws that prohibited the 
British from collecting on war debts.220 The states’ actions were an 
international embarrassment to the United States.221 While Congress, acting 
under the Articles of Confederation, attempted to get the states to comply 
with the Treaty of Paris, the federal government could not make state 
courts enforce the Treaty.222 The Supreme Court has described the attitude 
of state courts during that time as “notoriously frosty” toward British 
creditors.223 The Supremacy Clause became the long-term solution to this 
problem. 
Just as federal law draws upon and incorporates international treaties, 
federal law also draws upon and incorporates international law in 
general.224 The Supreme Court has declared, “International law is part of 
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice 
of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it 
are duly presented for their determination.”225 In the absence of a treaty, a 
controlling executive or legislative act, or a court decision, a court will look 
“to the customs and usages of civilized nations,” including academic 
commentary.226 Under the Supremacy Clause, such federal law preempts 
conflicting state law.227 
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SQ 755 handles the mandate of the Supremacy Clause awkwardly.228 
On one hand, the state amendment prohibits Oklahoma courts from 
“consider[ing] international law,” which the amendment defines as 
“includ[ing] international agreements, as well as treaties.”229 On the other 
hand, SQ 755 also directs state courts to “uphold and adhere to the law as 
provided in the United States Constitution,”230 which mandates that courts 
recognize ratified treaties as part of federal law. The amendment is self-
contradictory. Even if it were not, international law that is part of federal 
law is binding on the states, including Oklahoma. The state cannot defy 
federal law that is based on treaties. Accordingly, SQ 755 violates the 
Supremacy Clause. 
D. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE VIOLATION 
As well as the Supremacy Clause, SQ 755 also violates the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause of Article IV. The Clause says, “Full Faith and Credit 
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State.”231 When a court of competent 
jurisdiction, both personal and subject matter, in one state enters judgment, 
a court in another jurisdiction must respect the judgment.232 In this 
situation, the requirement of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is so 
“exacting” that such a final judgment “qualifies for recognition throughout 
the land.”233 Public policy exceptions to such judgments are not honored.234 
One of the aims of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was to “transform[ ] an 
aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation.”235 If local 
policy must give way from time to time, that “is part of the price of our 
federal system.”236 Although the court in the second state has to honor a 
judgment from the court in the first state, in the absence of a judgment, the 
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court in the second state does not have to adopt law from the first state to 
make its own decision.237 
SQ 755 provides that Oklahoma courts “shall uphold and adhere to the 
law,” including, “if necessary[,] the law of another state of the United 
States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law.”238 
One could interpret the mandate of SQ 755 to be that an Oklahoma court 
would not give full faith and credit to the judgment of a court in a sibling 
state if the court in the sibling state used Sharia in making a decision in that 
particular case. Alternatively, one could interpret the mandate to be that an 
Oklahoma court would not give full faith and credit to any judgment of a 
court in the sibling state if the sibling state itself used Sharia in any of its 
laws. Given the language of the amendment, either reading is logical.239 
Regardless of how one interprets this provision in the amendment, the 
provision violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Since Muslims may 
draw upon Sharia in matters related to contracts, marriage, divorce, and 
adoption, for instance, and since such matters may lead to court-enforced 
judgments in various states, other states would have to enforce the out-of-
state judgments.240 When an individual calls upon an Oklahoma court to 
give full faith and credit to either an out-of-state judgment that involves 
Sharia or a judgment from a state that more generally considers Sharia, 
under SQ 755, a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause would result. 
Additional full faith and credit problems arise with SQ 755’s 
prohibition of international and foreign law. The distinction between 
international and foreign law is worth noting in this context. International 
law is the law that nations of the world have agreed upon through 
treaties.241 In contrast, foreign law is the law of another nation.242 SQ 755 
specifically mentions international law and suggests foreign law through 
the language “other nations and cultures.”243 Especially in cases that 
involve international business, courts in other states may base their 
decisions on international or foreign law. Also, out-of-state courts may sit 
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in states that use international or foreign law more generally. When a 
judgment based on international or foreign law comes into being in a court 
in one state, or a judgment not based on international or foreign law comes 
into being in a state that more generally considers international or foreign 
law, a court in another state would have to accept the prior judgment 
pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. If Oklahoma courts were to 
refuse to grant full faith and credit to an out-of-state decision grounded in 
either situation, the courts would violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
On a related note, SQ 755 causes problems for comity, an idea closely 
related to the idea of full faith and credit. In terms of the judiciary, comity 
is the idea that, in the interest of courtesy, courts recognize the judicial acts 
of courts in other jurisdictions, including courts in other countries.244 In 
cases of family law or business disputes, as well as other areas of law, 
states can choose to enforce foreign judgments. For example, if a party to a 
divorce moves to the United States from another country and has a child 
custody arrangement from a foreign court, the party might ask a court in 
the state where the party now resides to enforce the foreign judgment.245 
Although the state court would not have to enforce the foreign judgment,246 
the court could opt to do so. Regardless of whether the foreign judgment 
was a good solution to the child custody situation, SQ 755 would prohibit 
its enforcement in Oklahoma. Thus, as it does with the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, the proposed amendment would violate the notion of 
comity. 
E. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE VIOLATION 
Not only does SQ 755 violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but the 
amendment also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Due Process Clause provides that no state shall “deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”247 
Under the procedural dimension of due process, the government must give 
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someone “of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.”248 If 
the notice is too vague, it will encourage “seriously discriminatory 
enforcement,” which is impermissible.249 
In this case, Oklahoma has not provided “fair notice of what is 
prohibited.”250 The state has merely told the public that “the courts shall 
not consider . . . Sharia Law.”251 The amendment then proceeds to define 
Sharia as “Islamic law,” which “is based on two principal sources, the 
Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.”252 This definition fails to address 
the deep complexity of Sharia, which includes centuries of Islamic law 
from the founding of Islam by the prophet Muhammad to contemporary 
times.253 Different schools of Islamic thought interpret the Koran and the 
teachings of Muhammad differently, which leads to different 
interpretations of Sharia within the Islamic community.254 With its 
definition of Sharia, SQ 755 fails to consider such complexity. 
A reasonable person would not know precisely to what form of Sharia 
the law referred.255 For example, if two Muslim parties wanted to enter into 
a business contract for the sale of motorcycles and agreed to some form of 
Sharia-based arbitration in the event of a dispute, the state law would not 
advise them which version or versions of Sharia to avoid. If the parties had 
a dispute, went to Sharia-based arbitration per their agreement, and asked 
an Oklahoma court to enforce the arbitration decision, and if the court were 
unable to do so under SQ 755, one of the parties could suffer a loss of 
property, the motorcycles, without “fair notice of what [was] 
prohibited.”256 Different courts could issue different results in similar 
cases, and, based on the vagueness of the law, the public would have little 
idea what type of Sharia to avoid. “[S]eriously discriminatory 
enforcement” would be a strong possibility.257 Accordingly, SQ 755 
violates the Due Process Clause. 
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F. CONTRACTS CLAUSE VIOLATION 
Beyond the Due Process Clause, SQ 755 violates the Contracts Clause 
of Article I. Under the Contracts Clause, “[n]o State shall . . . pass 
any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”258 The Contracts 
Clause applies to pre-existing contracts only.259 One of the concerns of the 
Framers of the Constitution was that states might pass laws that would help 
debtors at the expense of creditors.260 In addition to preventing relief for 
debtors, the Framers aimed to make credit more available by giving 
creditors confidence that they would be repaid.261 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not always been deeply 
concerned with an eighteenth century meaning of the Contracts Clause,262 
the Court has demanded that, when a state has caused “a substantial 
impairment of a contractual relationship,”263 the law must pass rational 
basis review. The state “must have a significant and legitimate purpose 
behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social 
or economic problem,”264 and the law must be reasonable and “of a 
character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation’s] 
adoption.”265 
SQ 755 violates the Contracts Clause because the amendment would 
impact forum selection and choice of law provisions, as well as mediation 
and arbitration clauses. Since SQ 755 prohibits consideration of “legal 
precepts of other nations or cultures[,] . . . international law[,] or Sharia 
Law,”266 a problem would arise when parties opt for foreign law, 
international law, or Sharia to frame their contracts. 
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A hypothetical situation illustrates how the law would impact a choice 
of law provision that calls for Sharia.267 In the case of a pre-existing 
contract, two Muslim businesspeople may agree upon some sort of Sharia-
based mediation for resolving a dispute. As long as the religious traditions 
do not violate secular law, the parties normally would be able to ask a court 
to enforce a mediation agreement, and the court would be likely to enforce 
the agreement. However, in Oklahoma, since the courts would be barred 
from considering Sharia, a court could not enforce the Sharia-based 
mediation. If resolving the dispute in a manner consistent with their 
religious values is very important to the parties, and if they have made the 
effort to put such an approach into their contract, the court’s inability to 
enforce the mediation would be “a substantial impairment of a contractual 
relationship.”268 The dispute could not be resolved in a manner consistent 
with the parties’ agreement. 
Oklahoma would have a difficult time showing a “significant and 
legitimate purpose behind the regulation.”269 SQ 755 does not specifically 
provide a purpose for the amendment. One purpose, suggested outside of 
the text of the amendment by Representative Duncan, was protecting 
Oklahoma from Muslim influence in a “culture war.” As previously 
explained, this is not a legitimate purpose. A more serious purpose for state 
action would be something like countering terrorism, but, even if the state 
did have a significant and legitimate purpose for the law, the law would not 
be reasonable and “of a character appropriate to the public purpose 
justifying [the legislation’s] adoption.”270 Here, the state clearly would be 
unable to show that prohibiting the consideration of Sharia in certain legal 
disputes would reduce terrorism. Most Muslim businesspeople who resort 
to the courts for enforcement of faith-based mediation are unlikely to be 
terrorists; instead, the businesspeople are regular individuals who have an 
interest in resolving their disputes according to their religious values. The 
means used for furthering a possible state purpose would not relate to the 
purpose. Thus, the amendment would violate the Contracts Clause. 
Outside of the constitutional realm, but still related to an underlying 
concern of the Contracts Clause, is the unpredictability of the business 
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climate in Oklahoma that would result under SQ 755.271 If the terms of 
contracts became potentially unenforceable, local, out-of-state, and foreign 
businesspeople would face greater overall uncertainty in their business 
dealings. Individuals and companies would become more cautious about 
doing business in such an unstable climate, and eventually less business 
would be likely to result. Additionally, SQ 755 facilitates the perception 
that Oklahoma courts would be hostile to applying foreign law, even if the 
parties to a contract agreed to that law in their contract.272 As a result, a 
foreign business would be more likely to demand a foreign forum.273 Also, 
when foreign jurisdictions detect this anti-foreign law sentiment, their 
courts will be less likely to apply U.S. law.274 Accordingly, harmful 
interference with business would be virtually inevitable. 
V. A RHETORICAL APPROACH BEYOND OTHERING MUSLIMS 
Someone unfamiliar with anti-Sharia rhetoric may ponder why the 
Oklahoma Legislature and the voting public that turned out on November 
2, 2010, seemed to distrust the state judiciary so strongly that they would 
aim to proscribe the state courts from “look[ing] to the legal precepts of 
other nations and cultures[,] . . . international law[,] or Sharia Law.”275 One 
might think that perhaps the rhetoric of “judicial activism” took hold in the 
public mind of Oklahoma.276 Then one might wonder upon what legal 
cases the public relied to determine that the judiciary had displayed an 
abuse of power that related to foreign law, international law, or Sharia. 
Although a state constitutional amendment generally changes the 
constitution and thus technically does not violate separation of powers 
among the branches of the state government,277 the legislature’s seeking to 
limit what the courts can consider would suggest interfering with judicial 
independence.278 
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The approval of SQ 755 signified more than public distrust of the 
judiciary, the third and least understood branch of government.279 The state 
legislature and its rhetorical allies, taking advantage of public ignorance of 
Islam and fear of terrorism, and attempting to make a connection between 
rank-and-file Muslims and terrorists, constructed Oklahoma Muslims as 
Others. Muslims make up less than 1 percent of the Oklahoma 
population,280 and no serious evidence exists that they tried to take over the 
state or even the state judiciary. Regardless, reason did not prevail. 
Further complicating this situation is the complex nature of religious 
identities, in this case those of U.S. Muslims. One can say that “links 
among Muslims of different races, regions, and languages remain more 
rhetorical than pragmatic, signaling a loose affinity of faith, not an actual 
alliance of forces, whether military or political or both.”281 Also, since 
factions exist within religious traditions, members of religious 
communities, including the Muslim community, contest religious space.282 
Given the rhetoric of ignorance and fear that promoted SQ 755 in 
Oklahoma, as well as the rhetoric of ignorance and fear regarding Muslims 
that the United States has produced more generally, a better non-Muslim 
understanding of U.S. Muslims, both in Oklahoma and around the nation, is 
essential to more civil and productive discourse that is respectful of 
everyone’s constitutional rights. The idea that non-Muslims, those 
generally in the privileged position in a religious context in the United 
States, do not need to change their rhetorical trajectory is problematic.283 In 
light of their social privilege and thus power, non-Muslims, most of whom 
are Christian,284 must play a key role in reversing the process of othering 
Muslims. 
The dialogic approach285 that this Article proposes begins with the 
Selves, the non-Muslims.286 Such non-Muslims should recognize Muslims 
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as “outsider[s] within,”287 or “stranger[s] in our midst[].”288 Rather than 
thinking of Muslims as elsewhere, non-Muslims should begin to see them 
as localized and here to remain.289 Indeed, Muslims and non-Muslims live 
in the same society.290 
Realistically, “one cannot assume that [physical] proximity of cultural 
others will lead to [productive] communication.”291 Without a doubt, a 
“gap of cultural difference” exists between the Selves and Others in the 
United States.292 However, the Selves need to cultivate the desire to 
communicate productively with Others.293 Motivation to communicate 
across cultures and religions stems from one’s ability to manage anxiety 
about the unpredictability regarding the communication.294 The success of 
SQ 755 in Oklahoma shows how difficult managing such anxiety is. 
Indeed, authentic communication with Others can lead to the 
uncomfortable questioning of the Self’s assumptions and beliefs.295 Useful 
intercultural communication skills that non-Muslims can employ “include 
empathy, the ability to adapt one’s behavior to the context, and the ability 
to gather information in order to reduce uncertainty about the other.”296 
Employing such skills allows one to develop intercultural competence and 
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become “a free agent engaged actively in a process of evolution and 
growth.”297 
Interactions with other people help to create one’s discursive reality, 
and this is true with the discursive realities that non-Muslims have 
regarding Muslims. One way of conceptualizing where the Self is in 
relation to the Other is through the Johari Window, a concept that 
psychologists Joseph Luft and Harry Ingram created in the 1950s.298 The 
Johari Window, illustrated below, helps communicating parties understand 
how the parties perceive one another.299 The idea is that, by reflecting on 
experiences, people become more aware of their reactions to those 
experiences and can apply the knowledge to situations in the future.300 
The Johari Window has four quadrants that facilitate reflection. 
Quadrant 1 represents what the Self and the Other know about the Self.301 
Quadrant 2 stands for what the Other knows about the Self but the Self is 
unaware of.302 Quadrant 3 represents the information that the Self keeps 
secret from the Other.303 Quadrant 4 stands for the information that neither 
the Self nor the Other knows about the Self.304 As people learn more about 
themselves, the quadrants change in size.305 Specifically, as individuals 
reveal more about their hidden selves and learn more about their blind 
areas, the unknown areas will shrink.306 Because of the possibility of 
finding something new through this communication, examination of the 
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Quadrant 1: Open Area 
 
 Known to Self and 
Others 
 Presentation of Self 




Quadrant 2: Blind Spot 
 
 Unknown to Self 
but known to 
Others 







Quadrant 3: Facade 
 
 Known to Self but 
not to Others 





Quadrant 4: Unknown 
 
 Unknown to Self 
and Others 
 Revealed through 
exploration and 
discovery 
One wonders whether any of the non-Muslim legislators who voted 
for SQ 755, or any of the non-Muslim citizens who voted for the 
constitutional amendment, previously had any serious conversations with 
Muslims. In a 2009 Gallup poll, individuals who reported not knowing any 
Muslims were “twice as likely to express ‘a great deal’ of prejudice” 
against Muslims as compared to individuals who reported knowing 
Muslims.308 Perhaps the fact that the population of Oklahoma is less than 1 
percent Muslim makes it difficult for non-Muslims to converse with 
Muslims.309 Indeed, non-Muslim residents outside of states like Oklahoma 
may have an easier time finding opportunities for dialogue. 
Regardless, nearly 30 percent of the voting public in Oklahoma 
disapproved of SQ 755.310 That figure represents a considerable minority 
that may be open to dialoguing with Muslims at school, at work, or in the 
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neighborhood.311 Indeed, the dialogue generally should unfold within the 
context of pre-existing relationships because more depth exists within 
human relationships than outside of them. Some of the individuals who 
voted against the amendment may be open not only to dialoguing with 
Muslims, but also to sharing those rhetorical experiences with family and 
friends who, while not the strongest supporters of SQ 755, may have voted 
for the amendment out of ignorance or fear. 
Dialogue should begin with Quadrant 1 of the Johari Window. After 
breaking the ice, the parties would take turns discussing what they feel they 
already know about each other. Examples of what parties may know about 
each other could be that non-Muslims who are Christian generally have 
Sunday as their holy day and that Muslims have Friday as their holy day. 
The depth involved in this part of the conversation would depend on how 
much non-Muslims and Muslims in the particular situation already know 
about each other. 
Next, the discourse should proceed to Quadrant 2. Since the non-
Muslim culture has othered Muslims, the Selves should begin the 
perception-checking process; this would be an offer of good will from 
members of the religious power structure. Specifically, what information 
do non-Muslims lack about themselves that Muslims know about them?312 
In other words, how do Muslims perceive non-Muslims? If non-Muslims 
discover that Muslims have substantiated negative perceptions about non-
Muslims, the non-Muslims may opt to try to change those perceptions by 
changing their own rhetorics and actions. If non-Muslims find out that 
Muslims have unsubstantiated negative perceptions about non-Muslims, 
the non-Muslims may realize that they themselves may have faulty 
perceptions of Muslims. Either way, the non-Muslims would have an 
opportunity to learn about how the Others see the Selves. 
Although non-Muslims have been in the dominant position and have 
had the opportunity to other Muslims, Muslims themselves may have their 
own perception problems about non-Muslims,313 so reversing the process 
would be beneficial. What information do Muslims lack about themselves 
that non-Muslims know about them? In other words, how do non-Muslims 
perceive Muslims? If Muslims find out that non-Muslims have 
substantiated negative perceptions about Muslims, the Muslims may opt to 
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try to change those perceptions by changing their own rhetorics and 
actions. If Muslims find out that non-Muslims have unsubstantiated 
negative perceptions about Muslims, the Muslims may realize that they 
themselves may have faulty perceptions of non-Muslims. Either way, the 
Muslims would have an opportunity to learn about how the Selves see the 
Others. 
Depending on the depth of the discussion related to Quadrant 2, the 
parties may, over time and with a developing relationship, be able to move 
to Quadrants 3 and 4. Discourse related to Quadrant 3 would involve 
intentionally revealing private information, such as personal religious 
experiences, to the other party. This would only happen if one party feels 
especially comfortable with the other party. Finally, discourse related to 
Quadrant 4 would involve the mutual discovery of new information. 
Through discussion, the parties could explore topics related to life and faith 
in a way that may lead to reflection and thus previously unknown insights. 
As the parties employ more productive communication to learn about 
each other, particularly in the context of faith, they should become better 
educated and will be less likely to engage in hateful rhetoric. Knowing 
more about the Self, including areas that need attention, makes relating to 
Others easier.314 If fewer members of the public produce and are receptive 
to hateful rhetoric, politicians will be less likely to engage in that type of 
unproductive discourse, and measures like SQ 755 will be less likely to 
develop and gain support. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Expressing concern that some politicians have sacrificed the rights of 
rank-and-file U.S. Muslims to engage in melodramatic political theater, this 
Article has argued that laws like Oklahoma’s SQ 755 are highly 
problematic. The Article noted how the United States in general and 
Oklahoma in particular have constructed, or at least tolerated the 
construction of, Muslims as Others, and the Article also provided some 
background on the genesis of SQ 755, a specific case of othering Muslims. 
The Article then explained how SQ 755 violates the Establishment Clause, 
the Free Exercise Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Contracts Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. Finally, the Article presented a dialogic approach that, 
through the Johari Window, offers hope for deconstructing the notion of 
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U.S. Muslims as Others and reconstructing them as Selves in mainstream 
U.S. society. 
When non-Muslims and Muslims come together to dialogue, they 
create a rhetorical space that allows for learning about Selves and Others. 
As cultures interface and learn, they have the opportunity to negotiate 
differences,315 hopefully in a manner far removed from hateful rhetoric 
designed to appeal to ignorance and fear. New Jersey Judge Sohail 
Mohammed observed, “When you are ignorant about something or 
someone, that brings fear. If you get to know someone and more about 
them, you remove that fear and we can see people for who they are.”316 
Although major differences exist, non-Muslims, most of whom are 
Christian, and Muslims will discover that they have common concerns such 
as social justice, human dignity, and freedom.317 These and other related 
areas offer possibilities for fruitful exploration beyond anti-Sharia rhetoric. 
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